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NSC BRIEFING Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000200050038-9 2 March 1954

## THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION

### I. Current Situation

Reconciliation Nagib and Nasr weak compromise inviting further struggle and possible deterioration ruling Revolutionary Command Council as absolute power in Egypt.

A. Authority Nasr and council weakened by developments.

B. Nasr, despite new post of prime minister, lost face and may also have lost some of his nerve.



D. Nagib basically weak, indecisive. Personality only asset.

Character not strengthened by return.

E. Member of governor general's staff at Khartoum on 1 *March* May

described him as "half there" suffering fatigue, shock and throat ailment.

F. Unknown elements in army apparently maneuvering for power.

G. Council has begun crackdown on unruly elements.

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II. Anticipated Developments Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000200050038-9

A. Future authority of Revolutionary Command Council could

now be uncertain. Position weakened by:

1. Continuing intra-council pbtting and maneuvering.
2. Possible challenge from new military groups.
3. Badly defined role of Nagib and his relations with Nasr and council.
4. Nagib's demands for increased authority over council reportedly cause of its decision to remove him on 25 February

B. Wafd, Moslem Brotherhood, Communists, other extremists, and old-line politicians expected to make strong effort to establish working relations with those actively controlling government ~~or with other army factions attempting to seize power.~~ *to Nasr*

1. Both Brotherhood and Leftist elements appear involved in return of Nagib.

C. Early return constitutional government remove despite public announcement.

1. No basis prepared.
2. Council and Nagib too preoccupied.

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D. No progress internal economic development during period  
of political confusion.

1. No basis prepared.

2. Council and Nagib too preoccupied.

E. Prospects Suez settlement in state of suspense.

1. Increased influence extremist sentiment in Egypt  
and uncertain internal security will lessen hope of  
compromise on Suez.

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F. Severe Sudanese disorders accompanying Nagib's visit to Khartoum and earlier reaction pro-Egyptian faction to announcement his ouster as president suggests instability in Cairo may have adversely affected Egypt's future position and influence in the Sudan.

### III. Immediate Future

- A. Period of confusion, internal maneuvering and loss of power by the council likely with resultant development more extremist military dictatorship.
- B. Extreme rightist anti-British sentiment likely to increase.
- C. Communism unlikely to assume significant position although it may attach itself to anti-British sentiment and rightist extremism.

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